The 1980s are known as the lost decade in Brazil. Average real GDP per capita growth went from 9.4% in the 1970s to 3.0% in the 1980s, and average annual inflation increased one order of magnitude across decades, from 40% to 430%. This dismal picture is not contained to economic variables. The Gini coefficient increased from
showing that inequality worsened during this period despite the move from dictatorship to democracy. Even poverty, which had fallen dramatically from 68% of households below the poverty line in 1970 to 39% in 1980, failed to show any sustained improvement over the subsequent decade, which experienced an average poverty rate of 35%, reaching 1990 with 36%. Although there were undeniable improvements in terms of democracy and political participation, even in this dimension there was considerable uncertainty with the first elected president in three decades coming to office only in 1990, just to be impeached less than two years later.
Palpable improvements in all these areas only really began after 1994, when Brazil finally beat hyperinflation; democratic stability with routine elections and alternation of power become commonplace; and an enduring and significant downward trend in income concentration and poverty began. It is thus natural to think of the preceding decade as a wasted period that would only be 'set straight' once the right people were in power and the proper policies got implemented in the mid-1990s. In terms of our framework this period of 1985 to 1994 represents a full cycle, initiated with a window of opportunity that changed the configuration of power and beliefs, bringing in new institutions and policies, and ending once the dissatisfaction with the dismal outcomes associated with those policies eventually induced a new window of opportunity for change which will be discussed in the next chapter.
With the advantage of hindsight, however, it is possible to see that some important elements of the transformations that would take place in Brazil after 1994 (described in chapters 5 and 6) originated and started to evolve during this earlier period. In particular the belief which emerged with the demise of the military cycle first became established in the mid-1980s with the transition to democracy and civilian rule.
This was a belief in social inclusion, which replaced the belief in prioritizing state-led economic growth and industrialization at all cost (developmentalism) with the notion that social inclusion and political openness should be a central goal of society, underscoring both institutions and policies (see discussion in the introduction to Part II).
We have argued that although similar rhetoric arose simultaneously across countries in Latin America the true nature of the belief varied significantly, leading to very different incentives and constraints on individuals, groups, firms and government, as a result of history, context and serendipity. In Brazil the belief in social inclusion turned out to be highly consequential in shaping institutions and policy towards openness, inclusion and participation. The Brazilian 'flavor' of the belief emerged as a consequence of their experience with oppression and lack of freedom during the military regime .
We have discussed before (introduction to Part II) that the immediate consequence of the belief in social inclusion was a disastrous hyperinflationary process that quickly dispelled the hope of regaining the glory years of the Brazilian miracle (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) . The emphasis in inclusion and correcting past injustices without attention to fiscal restraints and budget constraints not only allowed all manner of private interests to pursue their own ends but ultimately failed to improve the lot of the very groups it sought to protect, as the poor and excluded were the most vulnerable to the nefarious consequences of inflation. The distorting effects on the daily lives of individuals, firms and government of yearly inflation above 1000% for almost a decade was so painful and damaging that it is remarkable that the belief which underscored the institutions and policies that led to this state of affairs was not abandoned during this process or even once a new window of opportunity brought on a new and different cycle of beliefs, institutions and policies. In the next chapter we describe how the belief in social inclusion makes it through unscathed to the next period when it surprisingly starts to induce quite different types of outcomes as it is juxtaposed with a new belief that arises from the deep-felt understanding of the dangers of inflation and the need for institutions and policy to first and foremost assure monetary stability. As we shall see this new belief restricts and disciplines the belief in social inclusion, which slows the rate at which progress is made in that realm yet makes that progress more sustainable and transformative. First, however, this chapter describes the transformation of the 1985-1994 period.
The Transition to Democracy
In the previous chapter we described how the transition to democracy in Brazil Sarney's past involvement with the pro-regime ARENA party during the military period raised doubts about his suitability as an agent of change in a process that intended to break so clearly from the past.
[ Figure 4 .1 about here]
The new President's lack of political legitimacy made the transition to the first civilian government vulnerable to all sorts of pressure for immediate structural changes not only in the economic and political spheres, but also in social policies. The notion prevailed that the new government had to make good on a social debt towards those that had been the excluded from the 'economic miracle' of the previous decade, which had accentuated rather than diminished income inequality. Sarney tried to respond to those pressures by adopting the motto "Tudo Pelo Social" (Everything for Social Policy) as the top priority of his administration.
The strong corporative profile of demands and political pressures for social inclusion in a circumstance of declining capacity of the state to adequately respond to them made the government even more politically vulnerable. In addition to those demands the government was susceptible to pressure from an unprecedentedly massive new electorate. In the last direct presidential election in 1960 the country had approximately 16 million voters (22 percent of the population). In the 1989 election, with the inclusion of illiterate voters and the lowering of the minimum voting age to 16, the size of the electorate became five times bigger, 82 million (55 percent of the population).
The political manifesto of the Tancredo-Sarney campaign in 1984, known as the 'Commitment to the Nation,' reflected the aspiration of an inclusive and comprehensive agenda for change. With regard to social policies, the manifesto listed resolving income inequalities; implementing emergency measures against hunger and unemployment; revising wage policy and eliminating wage control; and guaranteeing of freedom and autonomy of labor organization. Concerning the political agenda the manifesto suggested the restoration of free and direct suffrage for the president and all mayors of city capitals; the convening of a Constituent Assembly; the restoration of the independence of the judiciary and legislative branches; the strengthening of the country's federal structure, with effective financial and political autonomy of states and counties; and the reform of the electoral law, allowing the unfettered formation of new political parties. Finally, with regard to the economic agenda, the government promised to address seven main concerns: the resumption of economic growth; the rescheduling of the foreign debt; the fight against inflation; tax reform; correction of regional inequalities; de-bureaucratization of the policy-making process; and the support of free enterprise with special emphasis on small-to-medium sized national firms.
The all-encompassing nature of this inclusive agenda generated too many expectations and soon revealed the limits of what such a heterogeneous coalition with a politically vulnerable president could deliver. In order to demonstrate goodwill and that his government would act in a democratic fashion, President Sarney decided not to make use of any unilateral political devices, such as decree and urgency powers, until a new constitution was written and approved. Congress duly stepped up to occupy the power vacuum left by the politically fragile president. Given this relative political weakness Sarney also decided to maintain the cabinet chosen by Tancredo Neves. This decision sent contradictory signals about which types of policy the government would pursue. On the one hand, the government had promised to address the country's difficult social agenda. This policy direction was supported by the Minister of Planning, João Sayad, who pressured for a heterodox economic policy. On the other hand, the Minister of Finance, Francisco Dorenelles, a nephew of Tancredo Neves, was a fiscal conservative and put forward an orthodox approach through domestic fiscal and monetary austerity, establishing a 10% cut in public spending, a two month suspension of all government bank lending, and one-year freeze of all public sector hiring. After twenty-one years of dictatorship, the announcement of such orthodox and austere policies was received with much disappointment by Congress. They wanted to demonstrate to their constituents, especially prior to the November 1986 elections, that they were responsive to voters' expectations on social inclusion. According to the Folha de São Paulo (January 14, 1986) , only 20 % of legislators declared support for Sarney's administration, 56% were politically neutral, and 25% were openly hostile.
As a consequence Sarney announced that the government would still strive to meet its foreign debt commitments, but not at the expenses of social deprivation at home. That translated into a great deal of resources to be spent on social policies.
Despite resurgent economic growth in 1985 the country was confronting annual inflation rates exceeding 200 percent. Daily life was constructed around ways to minimize the real losses inherent in such circumstances. Without access to interestpaying bank deposits the poor were especially hurt by inflation. In a struggle to impose his authority and political leadership, Sarney decided to replace the orthodox Minister of Finance appointed by Tancredo Neves by Dilson Funaro, an active businessman of the São Paulo Federation of Industry -FIESP who favored growth over fiscal austerity and who had been very critical of the IMFs demands for adjustments.
Following the introduction of the Austral Plan in Argentina, the heterodox Plano Cruzado was enacted by decree in early 1986. The plan quickly achieved its economic and political objectives, taming inflation and curtailing the falling popularity of the presidency and its governing coalition. The Cruzado Plan, which was designed to reduce inflation through a combination of price and wage freezes, boosted Sarney's popularity dramatically and reunited the Democratic Alliance. However, the redistribution of income inherent in the price freeze quickly led to excess demand for consumer goods overheating the entire economy. The business sector reacted by reducing supply and intensifying political pressure against fixed prices.
After a successful glorious initial period in which Brazil experienced Swiss levels of inflation, everything fell apart. The price freeze had to be short-lived so that prices could again fulfill their role of allocating resources. The upcoming general election of November 1986, which would also elect the legislators who would draft the new Constitution, made it politically expedient to postpone the realignment of prices.
The political success of the Cruzado plan paid off by generating a massive victory for the PMDB, which won all but one race for governorships, as well as the majority of the Chamber of Deputies (53 percent) and of the Senate (63 percent). It was the largest electoral victory to date by a political party in Brazil's proportional representation multiparty system, whose nature normally tends towards fragmentation.
Shortly after the election price adjustments were painfully implemented to address the shortages of goods. The timing of the adjustments was a clearly opportunistic electoral maneuver by the government. The impact of the adjustment package, named Cruzado Plan II, on the President's authority and popularity was very negative. The optimism generated by the first Cruzado Plan transformed into disillusionment as voters felt cheated with the Cruzado II. Sarney's political capital eroded quickly and he no longer managed to unify the Democratic Alliance coalition.
To make matters worse Brazil could not manage to meet the payments of interest and principal on its debt to private creditors, and declared insolvency shortly thereafter.
The country also declared a unilateral partial moratorium on its foreign debt interest payments. In the subsequent years a series of other economic plans or approaches were tried and failed (Bresser Plan in 1987 , 'rice and beans policy' in 1988 , Summer Plan in 1989 , Collor Plan in 1990 , Collor Plan II in 1991 . This sequence of frustrating failures induced a fatigue with government stabilization policy among the population and Faced with the demands of civil society and a lack of funding due to the national fiscal crisis, the elected governors financed their programs and policies by issuing bonds and debentures from the state treasuries using Anticipated Budget Revenues ("Antecipação de Recitas Orçamentárias" -AROs) as collateral. In addition state banks acted as de facto issuers of money because of the weakness of the Central Bank. This was done with no concern for the states' solvency, often using clearly illegal mechanisms, such as triangulation operations with state enterprises or the use of judicial writs (precatórios). This behavior "was encouraged by the certainty that in the end, In what follows we discuss the Brazilian constitution and make three points.
First we argue that the Constitution embodied the beliefs about a new social contract, political equality and rule of law that were forged during the fight against military rule.
However, this process was "messy" and full of "ugly compromises" as there was no template readily available. The constitution also incorporated old beliefs and the constitution-making process led to an inconsistent and contradictory text. Second, the very constitution-making process and the subsequent extensive amending activity that ensued had important consequences. The process was unprecedentedly inclusive and participatory reinforcing the beliefs that it reflected. Third, the Constitution fundamentally altered the subsequent path of Brazilian political economy. Several provisions had whopping short term consequences and are best conceptualized as an endogenous shock: the reduction of the voting age to 16 and the elimination of the ban on illiterates opened political participation to millions of individuals, which had hitherto been excluded. Similarly the extension of health care to all citizens, regardless of previous contributory history or work link and the equalization of the value of rural and urban allowances and benefits had major immediate impacts in terms of citizenship and fiscal effects. These are the foundations of what we will later call dissipative inclusion.
The process began with the beliefs in participatory democracy, rule of law and social inclusion that emerged during the authoritarian regime. The Constitution embodied these new beliefs but also old ones particularly about the role of the state in the economy. Ultimately, after a few years the constitutional status quo led to rounds of hyperinflation and to new updated beliefs amongst those in power about the importance of macro-stability and fiscal sustainability. In the wake of the constitutional reform process in Brazil starting during Cardoso's first administration (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) Constitutional politics has been at the core of the process of building an inclusive democracy and rule of law because the constitution contained detailed provisions, which have been widely invoked and respected. The salience of constitutional politics underscores a significant change in beliefs: the widespread notion that democratic procedure is the only legitimate way to reach collective decisions. The set of beliefs that the political elites finally adopted at the end of the decade-long "constitutional moment" centered on the notion that social rights had to be reconciled with the fiscal constitution.
The beliefs about democracy that marked the constitution-making process were forged during the years of military rule and reflected not only anti-authoritarianism but also a rejection of representative democracy. Lamounier was certainly expressing his first-hand experience from participating in the committee that drafted the first blueprint when he wrote that:
the regime created by the constitution of 1946 was -and still is today -, viewed as elitist, socially irresponsible and open to populist manipulation. During the authoritarian period, from 1964 to 1985, a new concept of democracy flourished, most notably among the grassroots and those groups linked to religious movements. The basic principle is that the new democracy has to be substantive and participatory rather than exclusively 'representative', in the conventional usage of the term" (Souza and Lamounier 1989, p. 31 ).
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The constitutional convention redesigned political institutions but there was no radical break from the institutional legacy of the military regime. Electoral rules, federalism and the presidential system -to name a few important components of the polity -remained unaltered in broad terms. Nonetheless, the new constitution delegated extensive powers to the executive while strengthening significantly the judicial and legislative branch. The key challenge for the constituent assembly members was how to reconcile the need to constrain a powerful executive -a deep rooted concern of political and economic elites, following the experiences of the First or Old Republic (1891 Republic ( -1930 and the Estado Novo (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) while preventing political instability and guaranteeing that the executive could implement its agenda.
The Constitution-making Process
The Constitution of 1988 is widely viewed as a historical landmark in contemporary Brazil. With 245 articles the Brazilian Constitution is one of the world´s longest and most detailed constitutions. In addition to provisions dealing with separation of powers and individual rights and guarantees the constitution contains numerous public policy issues. Not surprisingly, it has been termed a "code", a "constitutional monstrosity" and an "ugly compromise". 4 Rosenn stated that "Like a cathedral originally constructed as a hotel, the new Constitution is structurally flawed" (1990, p.
779). Rosenn also argued that the Constitution requires enactment of some 285 ordinary statutes and 41 complementary laws in order to make its provisions effective. This was indeed the result of the programmatic and controversial nature of many of the provisions; only by postponing the details to future legislation was the Constituent Assembly able to complete its task (Rosenn 1990, 778) .We argue that its very provisional and contingent nature has been instrumental to generating a constitutional culture embodying a set of beliefs that has been crucial to the establishment of constitutional democracy and ushering the country towards an open access society. The
Constitution was the product of an extensive bargaining process and therefore contains numerous technical flaws and inconsistencies as well as concessions. As a renowned Brazilian constitutional scholar argued:
"The constitution of 1988 is not the ideal constitution of any single group. Maybe its virtues are precisely its very flaws, imperfections that result from its delayed, controversial, and convoluted constitution-making process, which was the work of intense popular participation, of the contradictions of Brazilian society, and by the same token of much negotiation".
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An "ugly" but functional "compromise", the constitution became the focal point of myriad interest groups in a context characterized by strong political fragmentation.
The element that would introduce rationality in the system during the Cardoso years -a strong presidency -was largely absent from the constitution-making process, except in the discussion of the type of regime and in the discussion of the length of term of the chief executive. Although the largest party -the PMDB -commanded a majority of votes in the constituent assembly (54%), it was internally fragmented. The transition to democracy in Brazil was made possible by the formation of the so-called democratic alliance consisting primarily of dissidents of the Arena -the party that supported the military government -and the opposition party, the PMDB. As soon as the constituent assembly was inaugurated, the social-democratic group within the PMDB split to form Two characteristics of the drafting process are directly related to the elimination of the electoral college and popular presidential elections. First, the massive popular participation that ensued was unparalleled in any constitution-making process (Ginsburg, Elkins and Blunt, 2009: 208) . Owing to the overwhelming furor by the According to Martinez-Lara, a wide range of organized interest groups and professional lobbies "of all imaginable variations mobilized to press the Constituent Congress. Among these, the Movement for Popular Participation which managed to persuade Congress to provide direct access to the constitutional deliberations, through the popular amendments, as well as the incorporation of some direct forms of participation in the constitutional text itself" (Martinez-Lara (1996, 196) . 7 The media offered extensive support for the creation of groups and presentation of proposals, by collecting and sending the proposals to the constituent assembly. The O Globo media conglomerate ran spots encouraging the population to submit proposals. Citizens sent over 72,000 individual proposals to the constituent assembly secretariat. 8 Grassroots organizations presented a total of 188 popular amendments containing over 12 million signatures (Pilatti 2008 ).
The drafting process involved interest groups in many ways. Some provided advocacy services whereas others monitored extensively the voting behavior of participants. The absence of a strong hegemonic actor in the process -the president was relatively weak and the party system fragmented -allowed for extensive lobbying activities by interest groups. Volatile coalitions formed and disappeared swiftly.
Martinez-Lara describes the workings of the constituent assembly in graphic terms:
"these coalitions were not by any means consistent and stable. They had to be shaped, and reshaped, according to the issue at hand, involving re-alignments article by article and sometimes word by word" (Martinez-Lara (1996): 196) .
Second, the constitution-making process spanned 19 months, making the Brazilian constituent assembly one of the longest in history. The long time frame of the drafting process provided ample opportunity for interest groups to exert influence in the decision-making of the constituent assembly. The lengthy constitutional assemblies lead to a long charter, but more importantly, raised the stakes of the constitutional game.
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Text specificity implies that every single organized interest has a stake in the constitution, thus contributing to the endurance of its core set of values and principles 7 Martinez-Lara points out that : "in their attempt to influence the decision-making, these groups showed a high level of organizational sophistication, using all types of available methods: direct influence in the selection of candidates responsive to the their demands, the use of all forms of media communication as well as more direct methods , such as rallies and demonstrations (Martinez-Lara 1996, p. 196-7) . 8 Montclaire et al (1991) . See also the handbook on how to participate in the drafting process by Herkenhoff (1986) . 9 60% of the legislators polled at the beginning of the drafting process said that they "preferred a short text" (Martinez-Lara 1996, 72).
and relative effectiveness in many issue areas (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009, p. 86-87) .
The level of popular and interest group participation, the highly decentralized format adopted for the works and the duration of the drafting process all contributed to make the text an inchoate collage of proposals, some of which displayed inconsistencies. Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton (2009: 79) point out that the:
"Brazilian constitutional convention was characterized by an extraordinary public involvement, including the submission of citizens´ proposals. The Brazilian charter is an unwieldy document to be sure, but a highly public one in its origins and provisions. Already, it has endured significantly longer than has the typical Latin American constitution." Interestingly these were extended as a result of the new elites´ beliefs about inclusion rather than by mass mobilization.
Emblematic of the centrality of individual and collective rights and guarantees in the constitution was the inclusion of a chapter devoted to these issues in the first part of the constitutional text, instead of putting it at the end as in all previous constitutions.
The overarching concern about the disrespect for law prompted the drafters to hardwire detailed rules in the constitution, rather than ordinary legislation, so as to ensure that they would be respected. According to Rosenn: "many of the new Constitution's provisions represent significant liberal or progressive advancements, particularly with regard to protection of individual rights and expansion of the rights of the working class. Article 5 protects a large number of individual and collective rights. This enormous article appears to protect virtually every form of known human right" (Rosenn (1990: 789) . Procedural innovations were equally important. In fact, the most impressive achievements of the new Constitution are its procedural innovations in the protection of constitutional and legal rights. Constitution-drafters concluded that existing Brazilian procedural law had been woefully inadequate to protect constitutional rights.
The legislative branch also significantly strengthened its institutional prerogatives in budgetary matters and in its oversight capacity. The military wielded some veto power over security issues -rejecting the creation of a defense ministry headed by a civilian -as well as other critical issues such as the right to strike in essential services, and the expropriation of land in productive areas. Arguably land reform was the single most contentious issue and the one that galvanized the work of the Centrão. This was an area where it was particularly successful, being able to block the proposals for land expropriation of productive farms as well as more radical redistributive proposals, such as compensation of landowners with government bonds.
Although the Centrão presented some pro-market amendments it was primarily interested in opposing the demands of trade unions and leftist parties, in particular the most openly radical and socialist proposals for agrarian reform. In a number of occasions, however, the Centrão adopted a conservative programmatic stance. On the vote on article 1 of the constitution, the Centrão opposed the constitutional definition of the Brazilian polity as a legal democratic state based on the principle that "all power emanates from the people, who exercise it by means of elected representatives or directly, as provided by this Constitution". It proposed a motion defending a minimalist definition, by eliminating the expression "or directly" signaling a programmatic stance on representative democracy. Its defense of presidentialism (and a 5 year term for presidents) was not programmatic as it was a part of a private exchange between Sarney and its members involving patronage (posts in the bureaucracy and radio concessions).
The most interesting aspect of the constitution-making process was that there was some consensus among progressive and conservative forces, as they were known, around a core set of issues. They reflect the consensus on ISI and nationalism. Many of the Centrão members aligned with leftist parties around some nationalist provisions. In his discussion of the vote on the preferential treatment of Brazilian firms and state monopolies of mineral resources and oil, Pilatti (1988, p. 263) Article 6 declares that education, health, labor, leisure, security, social security, protection of maternity and infancy, and assistance of the unprotected are social rights. Article 7 contains 34 subsections that read like a miniature, progressive labor code."
Article 7 included: a 120 days maternity leave as well as a (unspecified) right to paternity; an 8-hour work day -6 hours in uninterrupted shifts -plus a 44 hour work week; a flat minimum wage equaling a minimum salary for all pecuniary pension benefits; the right to strike is constitutionally guaranteed but the ordinary legislation would specify measures to be taken in the case of essential services. In addition, Article 7 also stipulated that the creation, internal organization and functioning of unions is freed from public control (but only one union per territorial unit). Last but not least, a new provision mandated the equalization of rural and urban social security benefits. The equalization of benefits had an enormous negative fiscal impact.
The losers from the constitution-making process managed to secure that the Constitution would be subjected to a revision in 1993. A transitory article in the 1988
Constitution mandated that the Constitution would be subject to a full revision after five years of its promulgation. Business elites and liberal groups viewed the revision as a window of opportunity for the dismantling of the statist elements in the constitution.
However, the revision was a fiasco due to the eruption of a major budget scandal involving key legislators and to the lukewarm support -or in many cases even veiled resistance -it received from a key player, Itamar Franco, then president (Melo, 2000) .
As a fiscal constitution the Brazilian charter proved burdensome. First, the Constitution expanded massively social rights and entitlements. The equalization of rural and urban social security benefits entailed a large fiscal burden because all existing and future rural pensioners would be entitled to a full minimum pension (equal to a minimum salary). Second, the Constitution granted public sector employees the status of civil servants, thus entitling them to a full replacement rate (100%) for their current salaries, as opposed to private sector pensions whose limit was set to a ceiling independent of current wage. Third, the creation of the SUS (Unified Health System), entitling all citizens to a comprehensive array of health benefits independent of past contributions, created a massive fiscal problem. Importantly, the Constitution mandated fiscal decentralization, which meant that the states and municipalities gained a larger share of the revenue pie, to the detriment of central government. Equally important was the embodiment of the prevailing belief in state ownership, developmentalism and a rejection of privatization. Decentralization later prevented the adoption of effective fiscal policies and measures to stabilize the currency. Hyperinflations and fiscal crises during the Sarney (1985 Sarney ( -1989 and Collor (1990 Collor ( -1992 administrations generated fallout from the constitutionally mandated changes and from beliefs in developmentalism.
The developmentalist beliefs in the role of state ownership and intervention was as firmly entrenched in the Constitution as those associated with political equality and social protection. As we have argued, constitutional politics resulted from the beliefs in Brazilian society in the late 1980s and 1990s. The constitution-making process was unprecedentedly participatory, decentralized and protracted. When the fiscal and monetary crises unfolded in the early 1990s, they shattered these beliefs, providing a window of opportunity for the exercise of leadership. The new resulting updated set of beliefs was centered on the notion that social rights had to be reconciled with fiscal responsibility economic efficiency. We call this set of beliefs 'fiscally sound social inclusion."
The Constitution´s Delegation of Powers to the President
Foreigners who study Brazil today usually do so from the standpoint of her economic situation. Brazilians themselves do so. And both Brazilians and foreigners are baffled. Their studies lead them to no definite conclusions and they fall back on grandiloquent, albeit sincere phrase about the Great Future of Brazil. But when things are continuously not well with a country of Brazil´s formidable resources, there must be some causal factor that is constant to account for that phenomenon. High import duties, export taxes…, excessive borrowing valorization schemes, lack of continuity in the policy of public administration, social disturbances and revolutions -all these and other influences may be invoked to account for dislocation of trade and financial difficulties. But they are not prime causes and in themselves they explain nothing.
The origins of Brazil´s troubles are to be sought in the defect of the political regime. " (Hambloch 1936, 1) .
The Charter´s drafters shared Hambloch's concern with the defects of the political regime. Among them they worried about the role of the executive branch in the political system. The political elites were primarily concerned about reining in the executive branch following two decades of military rule, but also cared about governability. This explains one of their most important decisions, which prima facie look paradoxical: the strengthening of the executive branch. Indeed the Constitution of 1988 delegated extensive powers to presidents, while at the same time strengthening considerably the judiciary and the legislative branch. This collective decision was the upshot of a set of beliefs that emerged in the 1940s and 50s as a result primarily from the critical evaluation of the previous democratic experience during the period 1946-
1964.
During the democratic interregnum prior to the military regime, presidents lacked coordinating capacity as well the ability to implement an agenda, and this was a widely recognized source of instability. Both the Constitutions of 1934 and 1946 aimed at reining in presidential power and as a result created a weak presidency. In fact, in 1988 the set of beliefs informing constitutional choices about the role of the executive branch in the political system was to some extent a mirror image of that underlying the choices in 1934 and 1946 to the extent that they also aimed at introducing checks on the executive and constraining its action.
Reflecting the evolving criticism about the nature of Brazilian Presidential powers since its inception, progressive elites in the 1920s pressed for a number of political reforms including the introduction of proportional representation, the creation of an independent judicial branch in charge of organizing elections along with the adoption of the secret ballot and, finally, the strengthening of the autonomy of the states. For reformers proportional representation would allow political minorities and opposition parties representation in the legislature breaking away from the existing political monopolies in the states (which were typically one party systems). An independent electoral institution would eradicate fraud which was rampant. Finally, a strong federal system would impede power centralization which benefited presidents. assembly -"to rein in the executive so that it did not overwhelm public life by virtue of its discretion was the foremost concern of the constitutions of 1934 and 1946. The latter 21 According to Arinos (1949:89-90 ) : "we have adopted a system that is perhaps unique in the world a presidentialism with proportional representation that created strong parties… politically our chief executive is closer to those of European parliamentarism than to the president of the United States." Arinos also claimed that this change had weakened significantly the powers of the president: "How can we call a tyrant, the one who could wield power as long as he can maintain a coalition as in European parliamentarism?" The key to weakening the discretionary powers of presidents was through the "only genuine political revolution that ever occurred in Brazil, which was the electoral revolution consisting of the constitution of national parties, the secret ballot, proportional representation and electoral justice." Arinos concluded that "with the revolution in the electoral institutions the relations between the president and the governors and between the president and Congress had to be established in entirely new foundations from the ones that prevailed in the First Republic."
contained provisions prohibiting the delegation of powers to the executive, establishing that the law cannot exclude the Judicial branch from considering any violation of individual rights, regulating the preparation and oversight of budgets, requiring fair and prior compensation in case of eminent domain, stipulating detailed conditions for the use of state of siege ". (Lima,1974, 158) . 22 However both Lima and Arinos rightly acknowledged the inability of the executive branch to deal with the daunting tasks associated with promoting economic development which ultimately required a strong and agile president. The key word was delegation of powers to the executive, which was not allowed in the constitution.
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The Constitutional Reform commission prepared a number of amendments to the Constitution that were not put to the vote but which expressed the beliefs that persisted until the 1980s (Brazil 1956 ). Three such amendments pertained to legislative procedure: the first stipulated a procedure that ultimately granted the executive a The commission also proposed delegation from the plenary to legislative committees in the two chambers. According to Lima (p. 169), the rapporteur of these bills in the commission, to guarantee efficiency in the functioning of the legislature 23 For Arinos it was necessary to "adapt the presidential system…The delegation of powers is the most important of these adaptations. Notwithstanding the fact that the constitution formally prohibits it … it is the fallout of the overwhelming pressure of economic fact upon the public law" (Arinos, 1949, 95) . . Interestingly, the Constitution itself has been extensively amended since its enactment reflecting changing beliefs about the economic role of the state but also about the constitutional structure.
The decade long constitutional moment ended with an elites' consensus on inclusion with fiscal sustainability and powerful presidents operating in a constrained institutional environment.
Second, the constitution redesigned in fundamental ways the country´s social contract. Reflecting the change in beliefs, the constitution stipulates the new foundations for how public policy is to incorporate issues of inclusion and redistribution. Third, the constitution vested the presidency with great powers while also strengthening the Judiciary and the Legislative branch. Fortifying the presidency reflected a deep rooted concern of the elites; these enhanced executive powers, in turn,
were to operate in a constrained institutional space.
Fourth, the process was markedly erratic underscoring the uncertainties surrounding a transition period. The consensus around the rights Constitution -the provisions pertaining to social rights, individual liberties and rule of law -persisted throughout the transition. Nonetheless, the economic and fiscal Constitution was to be extensively amended. The Constitution has become a focal point of Brazilian democracy. By playing this role it has helped legitimize procedure over substance, which is an essential part of democratic life. The Constitution can be conceptualized both as the crystallization of beliefs but also as a focal point. A core set of beliefs, however, has not changed and they relate to rights, checks and balances and a powerful presidency.
It took a few years of experimentation for the recognition that changes had to be made. Indeed, the urgent need to update the fiscal and economic constitution did not take long to emerge. After one year of its enactment, during the seminar celebrating the 25 th anniversary of IPEA -the powerful government think tank which was in charge of strategic planning during much of the military regime -its director of macroeconomic planning argued that the key priority for economic policy was:
reaffirming and demonstrating to the political class that the alternative to limiting the public deficit and to short term recession was hyperinflationary chaos and economic stagnation in the next decade (Reis 1989 ).
Reis'observations signaled the recognition amid economic and development circles within the government that the old order was no longer functional and that the primary task was political: a pedagogy for inculcating the political lesson that the postconstitutional times required a break with the past.
Back to Uncertainty and Chaos
Despite the massive transformation towards social inclusion and openness that Several critics at the time pointed out problems and inconsistencies that made the Plans inherently flawed (Longo, 1991; Simonsen, 1991; Bresser Pereira and Nakano, 1991; and, Carvalho, 2003) . These evaluations proved to be correct: by the time the government released the frozen assets eighteen months later, Brazil had already returned to a hyperinflationary state with a quickly growing internal debt.
Given the massive levels of popularity with which the President started his term in office and the willingness of the public at that point to cooperate and even endure hardship for the sake of achieving meaningful change, these events can be interpreted as 
